In brief
Bangladesh’s newly elected government, led by Prime Minister Tarique Rahman, turned to China for investment and partnership, signalling a shift in the country’s foreign policy. Rahman’s recent overseas trip to Beijing included talks on cross‑border river management and a special economic zone near Mongla port. At the same time, relations with India are easing after the ousted leader Sheikh Hasina fled to Delhi, but tensions remain over border security and immigration issues. China’s involvement in regional projects, especially near the Siliguri corridor, has sparked security concerns in India, yet the Bangladeshi government views Chinese expertise as vital for hydrological projects. Dhaka must navigate these rival stances to secure economic growth and regional stability.
Bangladesh’s fresh government has turned to China for much-needed investment and partnership as it seeks to revive a sluggish economy, while also recalibrating its long‑standing ties with India.
Prime Minister Tarique Rahman’s first overseas official visit—a stop in Malaysia followed by a trip to Beijing—gave a clear direction for Dhaka’s foreign policy. The China leg proved more consequential, highlighting Bangladesh’s intention to deepen bilateral engagement.
Key agreements reached include a joint technical feasibility study to manage the Teesta River and a deal to develop a special economic zone near the Mongla port. These initiatives are followed by attention from both neighbors, as the two Asian giants battle for influence in Bangladesh.
Relations with India were strained after the August 2024 uprising that declared former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina ousted and forced her into exile in Delhi. While the interim government of Muhammad Yunus kept diplomatic links tight, the new BNP‑led administration has averted a full diplomatic rift.
High‑level visits have gradually resumed, with India issuing tourist visas and resuming bus services to Dhaka. In early 2025, Delhi sent emergency fuel via the Friendship Pipeline to Bangladesh as Middle‑East conflict rattled global supplies.
Nonetheless, friction at the border persists. Bangladesh has accused India of pushing thousands of mainly Bengali‑speaking Muslims into the country without proper repatriation, a claim that fuels anti‑India sentiment and complicates bilateral trade accords.
The Teesta River remains a sensitive point; India is wary of Chinese involvement near the Siliguri corridor—a strategic 22‑km “Chicken’s Neck” connecting the country’s mainland to the northeast. While Bangladesh insists on independent project oversight, Beijing has pledged that its cooperation does not involve third‑party influence.
China is already Bangladesh’s biggest defence supplier, accounting for over 70 % of arms imports, and has pledged to develop a China‑Myanmar‑Bangladesh Economic Corridor linking Yunnan province to the region.
The newly‑appointed government in Dhaka must carefully juggle economic ambitions with geopolitical realities. While Rahman’s administration seeks investment from China, it also has to maintain strategic ties with India—an essential neighbour for trade and regional security.
The balancing act remains challenging, yet it may unlock growth for Bangladesh and help stabilise the broader South‑Asian landscape.